[FreeTube](https://freetubeapp.io/) wasn't loading a video, so I tried opening it in the YouTube website instead. Rather than being able to watch a 13 second video ([here it is](https://youtu.be/_CQMs6j3FxE) in case anyone wants to know), I managed to capture is one of the most dystopian screenshots I've personally seen. Every single element of this image is truly astounding if you look close enough and think about it for a moment. 13 seconds of your life now costs you even more time to prove you're not trying to scrape a video from a hundred billion dollar corporation with nearly infinite resources, advertisements and clickbait grabbing at your attention, every interaction logged and sold to thousands of data brokers, and you can't even show your appreciation without selling more information by creating an account. How did we get here?

cross-posted from: https://reddthat.com/post/53812773

cross-posted from: https://feddit.uk/post/39190805

New York City mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani may have an ambitious policy agenda, but overhauling the self-governing and deeply dysfunctional behemoth that is the New York City Police Department is not on the list. Mamdani surprised supporters by asking current Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch to stay on after his inauguration early next year. Tisch, a technocrat heir to a vast real estate fortune, clashes with Mamdani on several fronts, including policy (she believes New York State’s bail reforms caused rising crime) and the geopolitics that inevitably make their way into New York City’s streets. (Tisch’s family are key figures in the Israel lobby; Mamdani is vociferously pro-Palestinian.) One area where Mamdani is guaranteed to clash with Tisch is on the NYPD’s massive technical surveillance apparatus and intelligence-gathering methods, which have metastasized since 9/11 to levels that rival the capabilities of a midsize country. More than one observer has characterized the NYPD as operating more like a US intelligence agency—at one point, the department’s Intelligence Division was run by a CIA veteran, and at least one CIA analyst was embedded at NYPD—than a police department. While Mamdani’s public safety proposals center on the creation of a $1 billion Department of Community Safety that will handle non-emergency 911 calls in place of armed cops, some of his other stated positions conflict directly with Tisch’s own positions and background with the NYPD, where she got her start in the department’s controversial intelligence division during the height of its “mosque-raking” mass surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers. Experts say the stakes in the current moment are far higher with regard to surveillance, largely due to the federal government’s nationwide immigration blitz using surveillance data gathered by police departments to track down and arrest targeted people. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson of George Washington University Law School studies the use of high-tech surveillance by law enforcement and is the author of The Rise of Big Data Policing. He has studied the NYPD’s sweeping buildout of networked CCTV, gunshot detectors, license plate readers, and video analytics since 9/11. The current wave of federal immigration raids, he says, have made clear how local police data such as fingerprints and license plate scans can be weaponized by an authoritarian administration and makes the current moment ripe for a reckoning on police surveillance. “In a horrible way, the sense of how technologies can be weaponized against people has expanded,” Ferguson tells WIRED. “When the government expanded its targeting, it also expands the conversation beyond the poor Black communities that were initially targeted by things like CCTV networks and predictive policing.” Mamdani’s campaign did not respond to a request for comment. The NYPD’s turn toward mass surveillance was begun in earnest by Commissioner Raymond Kelly during the immediate aftermath of September 11, buoyed by hundreds of millions of dollars in federal anti-terrorism grants. However, Ferguson says Kelly’s rival, former commissioner William Bratton, was a key architect behind the NYPD’s reliance on “big data,” by implementing the CompStat data analysis system to map and electronically collate crime data during the mid-1990s and again during his return to New York City in 2014 under Mayor Bill de Blasio. Bratton was also a mentor to Jessica Tisch and has spoken admiringly of her since leaving the NYPD. Tisch was a main architect of the NYPD’s Domain Awareness System, an enormous, $3 billion, Microsoft-based surveillance network of tens of thousands of private and public surveillance cameras, license plate readers, gunshot detectors, social media feeds, biometric data, cryptocurrency analysis, location data, bodyworn and dashcam livestreams, and other technology that blankets the five boroughs’ 468-square-mile territory. Patterned off London’s 1990s CCTV surveillance network, the “ring of steel” was initially developed under Kelly as an anti-terrorism surveillance system for Lower and Midtown Manhattan before being rebranded as the DAS and marketed to other police departments as a potential for-profit tool. Several dozen of the 17,000 cameras in New York City public housing developments were also linked through backdoor methods by the Eric Adams administration last summer with thousands more in the pipeline, according to NY Focus. Though the DAS has been operational for more than a decade and survived prior challenges over data retention and privacy violations from civil society organizations like the New York Civil Liberties Union, it remains controversial. In late October, a Brooklyn couple filed a civil suit along with Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (STOP), a local privacy watchdog, against the DAS, alleging violations of New York State’s constitutional right to privacy by the NYPD’s persistent mass surveillance and data retention. NYPD officers, the suit claims, can “automatically track an individual across the city using computer vision software, which follows a person from one camera to the next based on descriptors as simple as the color of a piece of clothing.” The technology, they allege, “transforms every patrol officer into a mobile intelligence unit, capable of conducting warrantless surveillance at will.” “It’s a really open question about whether he’ll push policies that’ll dismantle the infrastructure of mass religious and racial profiling and the pseudoscience of surveillance as safety, and focus on evidence based alternatives, or he’ll be too afraid of the NY Post,” says Albert Fox Cahn, the founder in residence of STOP. Referring to Tisch as the “mother of the DAS,” Fox Cahn questioned why Mamdani would choose to retain a police commissioner with a record on privacy and criminal justice that runs contrary to the mayor-elect. For instance, Mamdani has vowed to get rid of the NYPD’s controversial gang database—an elimination Tisch strongly opposes. “This raises a fundamental question: When mayors are so terrified of firing police commissioners who are inconsistent with their own agenda, do we really have democratic oversight of policing?” Fox Cahn says. “Are they overseeing police in name only, and if not, what does that say about the state of democracy in America? Forget Trump; this is on the local level.” Municipal oversight of the NYPD’s massive surveillance arsenal is indeed lacking. Even though New York City passed a relatively mild oversight law for the NYPD’s surveillance gear in 2020 that required the agency to disclose the purchase and deployment of new surveillance technologies, the department refused to comply. As a result, there is still no public accounting for the contracts, use policies, and deployments of many of the NYPD’s most invasive tools, including drones and robot dogs. Elizabeth Joh, a law professor at the UC Davis School of Law who has long studied police intelligence and surveillance practices, says that Mamdani’s progressive ideals are on a collision course with the NYPD’s operational model, which is founded on pervasive surveillance of the city. “What does it mean to be the mayor of a big American city, where the police have absolutely embraced techno-solutionism as policing, as the dominant attitude toward policing?” Joh says. One potential inflection point for NYC could be future immigration sweeps like those in Los Angeles and Chicago, where police are making use of data collected by local cops and biometric software to hunt down undocumented people. “Immigration enforcement will almost certainly be a flash point: The use of technology in that context is alarming people, and I’m not surprised feds are using live facial recognition,” Joh says. A New York Department of Investigation report last year lambasted Mayor Eric Adams and police officials for buying and deploying several new tools, including a semiautonomous robotic dog; an entirely useless Knightscope “security” robot; the StarChase GPS system, which allows officers to fire a tracking projectile designed to stick to a car; smartphone fingerprinting technology; and an augmented-reality program police officers can download on their phones. In August, the Legal Aid Society urged the city Department of Investigation to scrutinize the NYPD’s use of facial recognition technology after The City reported that the NYPD used an FDNY account with Clearview AI to identify a pro-Palestine protester at Columbia University. The NYPD also maintains a facial recognition database that includes photographs of juveniles, according to 2019 reporting by The New York Times. Three bills are currently in front of New York’s city council to ostensibly strengthen its visibility into the NYPD’s surveillance arsenal (including a requirement to draft formal facial recognition use and audit policies). However, the City Council has far less power to scrutinize and set policy for the police department’s spying capabilities than many other cities that passed legislative reforms in the 2010s thanks to intense lobbying by the NYPD against a stronger bill. Beyond creating a Department of Community Safety, Mamdani’s other rare point of policy clarity on public safety concerns the department’s repressive approach to protests and the role of its controversial intelligence division in conducting mass surveillance on Muslim New Yorkers. The Demographics Unit, created under former commissioner Ray Kelly by a CIA officer loaned to the NYPD in the mid-2000s, went about mapping Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in the city’s five boroughs. Meanwhile, undercover officers were sent to infiltrate religious congregations and student groups as far afield as Connecticut and New Jersey. Although the Demographics Unit has been disbanded, and the department’s “mosque-raking” operations led to a legal settlement, activists and legal workers say the department’s surveillance in Middle Eastern and South Asian communities is still prevalent. Notably, Tisch’s family is best known around New York City for its philanthropy, with the family name adorning concert halls, museum wings, and university departments. The family is also known for donating heavily to Israeli causes (Jerusalem's Tisch Biblical Zoo, for example), with Jessica’s father playing key roles in the US Israel lobby and donating heavily to both pro-Trump Republican congressional candidates and GOP political action committees. Her extended family threw at least $900,000 into supporting Andrew Cuomo’s failed NYC mayoral bid—including her mother, former New York state regent Merryl Tisch. Jessica Tisch got her start at the NYPD in the Kelly-era Intelligence Bureau building dossiers on Muslim extremism. In January, she gave the opening remarks at a training on “combatting antisemitism” that labeled participants in Students for Justice in Palestine as “campus extremists” and claimed that SJP was responsible for a 300 percent increase in antisemitism at American colleges and universities. At the training, keffiyehs and watermelons were branded as “antisemitic symbols” that “incite hatred, violence, or discrimination against Jewish individuals or communities.” The NYPD’s violent repression of pro-Palestinian protests, documented extensively by The Nation, will almost certainly be an issue for Mamdani. Senior NYPD officials have attended trainings and events held by far-right Zionist organizations, and the agency is still fighting court-ordered restrictions on protest policing imposed as part of a settlement for its behavior during the 2020 George Floyd demonstrations. Another open question is the NYPD’s ongoing use of the New York City Police Foundation as a conduit for controversial surveillance technology and the underwriting of its overseas detectives program by foreign governments. The foundation still foots the $1,204,126 bill for the NYPD Intelligence Bureau’s “international liaison” program that posts detectives overseas to 11 countries, including Israel, Spain, France, Australia, and Singapore. That cost rose significantly from $948,261 in 2023. In the past, corporations that did business with the NYPD also contributed money to the foundation, raising questions about quid pro quos and the use of the police “booster” nonprofit as a way to circumvent public procurement procedures, particularly for surveillance equipment. The United Arab Emirates also paid $1 million to the NYC Police Foundation, according to 2012 tax records, which was the same amount that covered the entire overseas detectives program that year, according to a report by The Intercept. An NYPD detective has been posted to Abu Dhabi since 2009. The Police Foundation also serves as a key nexus for the local business community’s influence over the NYPD. Two members of Tisch’s family sit on the NYCPF’s Board, according to the nonprofit’s latest tax filings. Per reporting by veteran police scribe Leonard Levitt, one of Tisch’s relatives convinced then-commissioner Ray Kelly to give her a posting in the NYPD in the late 2000s, leading to her hiring. Kelly denied Levitt’s reporting in a 2015 interview with Bloomberg. Tisch did not respond to WIRED’s requests for comment. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in late 2024, Tisch said that a “friend” made the key connection with Kelly and steered her to the intel division job. The Police Foundation is also involved in the NYPD’s rapid expansion of its drone unit under Mayor Eric Adams. In 2024, the foundation spent $230,750 to buy drones for the NYPD’s transit command. At the time, the department’s drone expansion was overseen by Kaz Daughtry, a controversial police official and Adams ally who faces accusations of heavy drone surveillance by pro-Palestine activists and residents of Brooklyn neighborhoods subjected to blanket drone patrols during Labor Day cookouts in 2023. Although Mamdani’s mayoral campaign was defined by his relentless emphasis on affordability, the looming battles with the Trump administration over immigration enforcement and the breakneck buildout of the NYPD’s already formidable surveillance arsenal under Adams means he will be forced to reckon with the police department’s spying programs. ​​”Mass surveillance endangers all values at the heart of our democracy, and I do hope that our next mayor is willing to be a spokesperson for this cause,” says STOP’s Fox Cahn. “You can’t be a sanctuary city and a surveillance state—you can’t promise to protect undocumented neighbors and provide a data pipeline to ICE.”

Patrick Breyer @echo_pbreyer@digitalcourage.social 🇪🇺⚠️ A perfidious trick? The EU Council Presidency wants to introduce mandatory #ChatControl through the backdoor 🚪: An Art. 4 amendment would MANDATE "all reasonable mitigation measures," including scanning, enforced with sanctions! 😡 https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2025/11/2025-10-30_Council_Presidency_CSAR_Policy-debate_14032.pdf

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/38375389

I'm using e/OS on a fairphone 6 since some months. I would like to use Android Auto for long trips, though the [official documentation](https://doc.e.foundation/support-topics/android-auto) tells me to install Google, Google Maps, Google Speech Recognition and then Android Auto. What privacy implications has installing these? Does the "Advanced Privacy" of e/OS help in keeping my data as far as possible? I know, that using Google Maps and Android Auto will give Google the usage data of what I'm doing in these while I'm using them. But what about when they are currently not in use? Or apps, that I use while Android Auto is active, but which don't have an integration for it? There seems to be a set of OSS stub apps, that replace the Google Apss, though from what I have found online they give very mixed results.

Nanogram is made for the privacy conscious enthusiast who wants total control of their data. Create a small scale private social media platform for family and friends. The onion service and web server are hosted directly on your phone via termux. User access can be granted by generating a magic invite link in the server manger. These are one time use links that allow registration to the service.  **Application Demo** [here](https://streamable.com/69eerd) **Install Demo** [here](https://streamable.com/n3kd1i) **Source code** [here](https://bin.disroot.org/?e37b25c7442cdd06#2n7MYnfaPqV5MwLyfDaYEnb4NgVcCTz4DBnkWehhLrFu)

Unbelievable...

I wonder how many people using discord have this enabled by default. Pretty sure Krisp records everything you say and uses your voice to train ai models. Not that it's a big deal since everything on discord is completely insecure and not private at all. I'd like to ditch discord but there's no way I can convince people to leave it, there's really nothing as easy out there right now. They'll put up with the enshittification until it's ads plastered all over the screen.

I use a Google Pixel and I can't use GrapheneOS since my phone is carrier locked. Google play services is likely the biggest privacy invasion I have right now, and I can technically disable it entirely since I don't use many proprietary Google apps; I mostly use FOSS and privacy respecting alternatives. What do I do to improve my privacy? I have location services off constantly but am sure that Google play services just bypasses it.

### Introduction I wanted to explain the structure of freedom, and why part of what constitutes a free society is the right to privacy. One of the most difficult parts of educating people on privacy is the confusion about what it actually is. People often confuse privacy with secrecy, privacy with anonymity, and privacy with security. I want to distinguish between multiple related terms and show the structure of how, in order to have a truly free society, you need the right to privacy. ### What is privacy? I want to be very clear about what privacy actually is and is not. Privacy is *not* hiding everything about yourself. Hiding things is *secrecy*. Privacy is *not* hiding who you are. Hiding who you are is *anonymity*. Privacy is *not* protecting your information. Protecting your information is *security*. Privacy is the *ability* to choose what you share. That gives us our first clue about the structure of a free society. Secrecy relies on privacy, because if you can't choose what you share then you cannot keep secrets. An example of secrecy would be hiding how much you make at your job. An example of privacy is *choosing* to exercise that secrecy. In the moments between someone asking you how much you make and telling them you don't feel comfortable sharing that, you take a moment to decide whether or not you want (or consent) to telling them. That is privacy. ### Why the distinction? The distinction between privacy and secrecy is incredibly important for making arguments about privacy. People may say "I have the ability to choose what I share, because I am able to choose your level of privacy if I want to." What they really mean is that they can choose your level of *secrecy*. You don't choose to be under surveillance, but you can choose to protect yourself from surveillance, not by hiding everything you do but by eliminating the things that are tracking you in the first place. In reality, many people cannot choose the same level of secrecy. Privacy is eroded in the background, and many people don't realize how far surveillance really goes. Becoming secretive is not the solution, because that is the same as eliminating your free speech in the face of being persecuted. This is our second clue about the structure of a free society, because free speech relies on both privacy and secrecy. ### What is security? Security is, simply, measures taken to protect something. Encryption is an an example of security, because it is used to protect sensitive data from unwanted intrusion. I want to make a clear distinction between security and safety. Security protects you *before* an intrusion occurs, whereas safety protects you *after* an intrusion occurs. An example of safety is a surveillance camera. A surveillance camera cannot stop a crime from occurring, but it can record evidence to convict a criminal after the fact. On the other hand, strong locks are an example of security, because they protect a store from being broken into *before* a theft takes place. I deliberately call them surveillance cameras instead of security cameras, because safety is different from security. When the news talks about security measures, often times they are really referring to safety measures. Safety measures are often privacy invasive, because they usually require a level of data retention to be effective. Security protects against unwanted intrusion. If there is unwanted intrusion on data, that means it was shared without consent. Because of that, if there is no security, there is no privacy either. That gives us our third clue about a free society. A free society does not *need* safety, it *needs* security, and privacy is not possible without security. ### What is anonymity? Anonymity means hiding your identity. Because it directly relies on hiding something, it's immediately obvious that anonymity relies on secrecy. Anonymity is the best defense against a corrupt government, because it allows us to speak up against corruption without fear of persecution. Even with perfect secrecy, we ourselves can still be convicted by exercising our right to privacy. This is the final piece we need to see what a free society relies on, because without a way to combat corruption, there is no way to be free. ### What is freedom? We've finally arrived at the final section, which puts together the pieces to show what is necessary for a free society. While this is only part of what freedom requires, it is not a part that can be ignored.  This pyramid of freedom shows the dependencies for each element. Security is the foundation that everything else is built on. Privacy relies on security to prevent unwanted violation of consent. Secrecy relies on privacy to prevent sharing without consent. Anonymity relies on secrecy to hide your identity. Finally, freedom relies on anonymity to fight against corruption. You may notice safety is not on there. While safety can be good, it often violates some aspect of the pyramid. It isn't necessary for a free society. In fact, safety doesn't even need security. Surveillance cameras are breached all the time, but that doesn't change their purpose or effectiveness. ### Conclusion Privacy is essential for a free society, but it isn't the only essential liberty. Security is the foundation that privacy is built on, and even that is eroded away by conflating security with safety. Knowing the distinctions and relationships between the various elements is incredibly useful when speaking up about privacy, because even if you can defend every "nothing to hide" argument, people still tend to have a fundamental misunderstanding about what privacy really is. ### Lack-of-AI Notice I've been burned before, so I always try to mention that **none of my content is AI generated.** It isn't even AI assisted. Just because something is comprehensive and well-structured does not make it AI generated. Every word I write is my own. Thank you for your understanding. This was my first time testing an easier way for me to create posts by first drafting them in [Iotas](https://apps.gnome.org/Iotas/). I had a couple hiccups such as forgetting to insert the image and forgetting to double newline paragraphs, but it worked alright.

Just curious what laws people would like to see passed where they live related to privacy. Can be an existing law in another country you'd like to see in your own, something new entirely, or repealing an existing privacy-invading law

> In October 2023, Jabber.ru, “the largest Russian XMPP messaging service”, discovered that both Hetzner and Linode had been targeting them with Machine-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks for up to 6 months. MITM attacks are when an unauthorised third party intercepts traffic intended for someone else. At the point of interception, the attacker can inspect and even modify that traffic. TLS was created to mitigate this; all communication between the two parties is encrypted, so the third party sees nothing but gibberish (ciphertext). > > TLS is great, but it’s actually not enough when the attacker owns your network, as in Jabber.ru’s situation. Jabber.ru rented servers from Hetzner and Linode, who altered their network’s routing setup to obtain TLS certificates for Jabber.ru’s domains and successfully carry out a MITM. When connecting to an XMPP server, most clients are only configured to look for a valid certificate. A valid certificate matches the service’s domain name, is not expired, and is authorised by a known and trusted Certificate Authority (CA). If the client sees a certificate that’s signed by an unknown CA or whose expiry has passed or the domain in the cert doesn’t match the service domain or any combination of those, it’s considered invalid; the client should terminate the connection before transmitting sensitive data, such as the user’s password. > > Because Hetzner and Linode controlled Jabber.ru’s network, they were able to meet all of those conditions. XMPP clients would just accept the rogue (but valid!) certificates and continue along as normal, unaware that they were actually connecting to a rogue server that forwarded their traffic (possibly with modifications) to the proper server. > > A fairly straightforward mitigation involves DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, or DANE. This is just a standard way to securely communicate to clients what certificate keys they should expect when connecting. When clients initiate a connection to the XMPP server, they receive a TLS certificate that includes a public key. If the server admin has implemented DANE, the client can verify that the public key they received matches what the server administrator said they should receive. If they don’t match, the client should terminate the connection before transmitting sensitive data. > > [...] Some posts here indicate people don't know the basics & are still feverishly explaining why they are so smart that they gave an NED-funded app their phone number like this is somehow defensible. Or worse posting that blog where "Soatok" argues stickers + ease of use trump technical concerns in the end. Please do not let some niche skill monopoly turn you into an egomaniac, if you are even really part of one 🤨

TL&DR; there's a local **win** but it's not over yet. We need to push so that even "voluntary" surveillance is not allowed. Full post below. > The Danes will seek to propose a voluntary detection regime in the CSAM proposal, instead of controversial mandatory detection orders > > The Danish Council presidency is backing away from pushing for mandatory detection orders in a legislative proposal that aims to tackle the spread of online Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), the country’s justice minister said on Thursday. > > Earlier in their presidency, Denmark had revived a controversial provision in the draft law that would mean online platforms – such as messaging apps – could be served with mandatory CSAM detection orders, including services protected by end-to-end encryption. However opposition from several other EU countries derailed any agreement in the Council. > > Today, Danish Justice Minister Peter Hummelgaard told local press that the Council presidency would move away from mandatory detection orders – and instead support CSAM detections remaining voluntary. > > The presidency circulated a discussion paper with EU country representatives on Thursday, aiming to gather countries’ views on the updated (softened) proposal in a bid to find a compromise, Euractiv understands. > > The Danes are concerned that if no agreement is reached on the proposal even voluntary scanning will not happen once the current legal scheme that enables that runs out in April 2026. > > The CSAM proposal – dubbed “chat control” by opponents – has repeatedly failed to achieve support in Council, which has spent years trying and failing to agree its negotiating mandate. > > Earlier this month, Germany’s justice minister came out against the plan, with a strong-worded public statement that attacked “unjustified chat monitoring”. > > The mandatory detection orders contained in the original Commission proposal have proven to be the biggest sticking point – triggering major privacy and security concerns. > > Critics warn that such an approach risks opening the door to mass surveillance of European citizens, as well as pointing out that it would run counter to existing EU laws that seek to ensure data protection and the privacy of communications. > > If the Danes manage to find a compromise in Council on a version of the CSAM proposal that strips out mandatory detection orders the draft law could progress towards trilogue negotiations with Parliament, finally moving on from years of deadlock.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.dbzer0.com/post/56810574 > The article itself is from August, but after seeing Flock cameras at a local Lowe's store that were missing from the DeFlock map, I thought it'd be worth bringing increased attention to such companies contributing to the propagation of Flock cameras. If there's a Home Depot or Lowe's near you that's not on the DeFlock map already, it might just not have been added yet.

How can I check to see if a given Onion Service is still in-use? To be clear: I'm *not* asking about just Onion Services bound to port 80. Of course I can just `curl` it, but that won't tell me if the Onion Service is running something on another port. I'm trying to find an XMPP server that uses an Onion Service. I found [several lists](https://forums.whonix.org/t/xmpp-onion-service-only-no-clearnet/21379/4) of XMPP servers and their `.onion` names, but I expect most of these services are offline. ``` 2n3tvihf4n27pqyqdtcqywl33kbjuv2kj3eeq6qvbtud57jwiaextmid.onion 32qywqnlnqzbry42nmotr47ebts3k6lhiwfob6xniosmepz2tsnsx7ad.onion 4colmnerbjz3xtsjmqogehtpbt5upjzef57huilibbq3wfgpsylub7yd.onion 6voaf7iamjpufgwoulypzwwecsm2nu7j5jpgadav2rfqixmpl4d65kid.onion 6w5iasklrbr2kw53zqrsjktgjapvjebxodoki3gjnmvb4dvcbmz7n3qd.onion 7drfpncjeom3svqkyjitif26ezb3xvmtgyhgplcvqa7wwbb4qdbsjead.onion ae3w7fkzr3elfwsk6mhittjj7e7whme2tumdrhw3dfumy2hsiwomc3yd.onion chillingguw3yu2rmrkqsog4554egiry6fmy264l5wblyadds3c2lnyd.onion fzdx522fvinbaqgwxdet45wryluchpplrkkzkry33um5tufkjd3wdaqd.onion gku6irp4e65ikfkbrdx576zz6biapv37vv2cmklo2qyrtobugwz5iaad.onion gois4b6fahhrlsieupl56xd6ya226m33abzuv26vgfpuvv44wf6vbdad.onion j4dhkkxfcsvzvh3p5djkmuehhgd6t6l7wmzih6b4ss744hegwkiae7ad.onion jabjabdea2eewo3gzfurscj2sjqgddptwumlxi3wur57rzf5itje2rid.onion jaswtrycaot3jzkr7znje4ebazzvbxtzkyyox67frgvgemwfbzzi6uqd.onion jeirlvruhz22jqduzixi6li4xyoweytqglwjons4mbuif76fgslg5uad.onion jukrlvyhgguiedqswc5lehrag2fjunfktouuhi4wozxhb6heyzvshuyd.onion mrbenqxl345o4u7yaln25ayzz5ut6ab3kteulzqusinjdx6oh7obdlad.onion nixnet54icmeh25qsmcsereuoareofzevjqjnw3kki6oxxey3jonwwyd.onion qawb5xl3mxiixobjsw2d45dffngyyacp4yd3wjpmhdrazwvt4ytxvayd.onion qwikoouqore6hxczat3gwbe2ixjpllh3yuhaecixyenprbn6r54mglqd.onion qwikxxeiw4kgmml6vjw2bsxtviuwjce735dunai2djhu6q7qbacq73id.onion razpihro3mgydaiykvxwa44l57opvktqeqfrsg3vvwtmvr2srbkcihyd.onion rurcblzhmdk22kttfkel2zduhyu3r6to7knyc7wiorzrx5gw4c3lftad.onion szd7r26dbcrrrn4jthercrdypxfdmzzrysusyjohn4mpv2zbwcgmeqqd.onion xdkriz6cn2avvcr2vks5lvvtmfojz2ohjzj4fhyuka55mvljeso2ztqd.onion xiynxwxxpw7olq76uhrbvx2ts3i7jagqnqix7arfbknmleuoiwsmt5yd.onion xmppccwrohw3lmfap6e3quep2yzx3thewkfhw4vptb5gwgnkttlq2vyd.onion ynnuxkbbiy5gicdydekpihmpbqd4frruax2mqhpc35xqjxp5ayvrjuqd.onion yxkc2uu3rlwzzhxf2thtnzd7obsdd76vtv7n34zwald76g5ogbvjbbqd.onion ``` I don't want to eliminate them just for not running an HTTP server (eg port 80, 443, 8080, etc). Nor do I want to eliminate them for not running on a common XMPP port (5222, 5223, 5269, 5298, 8010). I'm trying to find something that checks if an Onion Service has been used in the past days/weeks *without* requiring me to test a connection on a given port. My understanding is that Onion Services will (by default) generate and [publish hidden service descriptors](https://spec.torproject.org/rend-spec/hsdesc.html) (HSDir). Is there some way I can query the Tor directory of HSDirs to see if a given Onion Service is still active?

I see more and more apps and services requiring a selfie to proceed. What are our privacy minded people doing when they want to use a service but not provide the selfie?

Edit: Based on the article: Facebook has recently gotten an Ex-Meta Member into the Data Protection Agency of Ireland near end of 2024. They were sued for 250 million euro. They are back now actively trying to push for lower data protections in the EU publicly saying "It will hurt Meta" Edit 2: The link was free when I read it but they changed it to subscribed so not even worth going into the link now. If you have alternative ways to read it then I recommend that. Sorry for not being able to find better sources

Dears, I'm asking for your DVD player recommendations - I'm done with the streaming platforms. I'm looking for something simple and robust with all the important key features but I'm a little lost with the current offer. What's a must have? *Ideally, I'd go for a player that has both HDMI and USB-C in output, to make sure it still works fine in the future - but I'm not sure USB-C output exists.* Now I'm also questioning the need of BluRay/image upgrade, as it shouldn't be too expensive. Do you use a DVD player? What is your recommendation? Would any 2nd have from 2010's do the job? Thanks in advance! EDIT: I understand USB-C output does not exist - and any 2nd hand Blu-ray player would be perfect and be quite cheap! Thanks all for your comments!

I mean with the stupid names, could you not?! carving out interest in this crowded space is a challenge onto itself, you don't hafta shoot yourself in the foot from the get-go! that aside, anyone got experience with the thing?

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.zip/post/52101456

It's really sad to see SimpleX goes the shitcoin route to try and fund their project, Ethereum is not ethical as I briefly explained in this post Now is a perfect opportunity to fork the project with I2P and add Monero as the payment option both for people to transact and fund the developers and I2P operators

> Differential privacy keeps that data private. It’s a mathematical framework whereby a statistical output can’t be used to determine any individual’s data in a dataset, and the bureau’s algorithm for differential privacy is called TopDown. It injects “noise” into the data starting at the highest level (national), moving progressively downward. There are certain constraints placed around the kind of noise that can be introduced—for instance, the total number of people in a state or census block has to remain the same. But other demographic characteristics, like race or gender, are randomly reassigned to individual records within a set tranche of data. This way, the overall number of people with a certain characteristic remains constant, while the characteristics associated with any one record don’t describe an individual person. In other words, you’ll know how many women or Hispanic people are in a census block, just not exactly where. > On August 28, Republican Representative August Pfluger introduced the [COUNT Act](https://mcusercontent.com/d4254037a343b683d142111e0/files/aae8dae1-a65f-58d1-a37e-2293fd46880f/PFLUGE_104_xml.pdf). If passed, it would add a citizenship question to the census and force the Census Bureau to “cease utilization of the differential privacy process.” Pfluger’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Hello all! I have a situation and I was curious what other people recommend me do. I have a Pixel 8a with GrapheneOS on it and have setup a separate user profile to have work stuff and my banking app on. At the moment my bank doesn't have a web interface, it exclusively uses the phone app to do everything. (apparently they'll be releasing the web version of the app next month but I have no other extra information on how it will work or whatever) I've noticed that periodically they do some kind of scan that ends up blocking me from using the banking app (it locks it down with an alert that says something along the lines of: "your device might be rooted and compromised"). First time this happened I had to call them up and they sent me from one department to another and 2 days later I had access back in the app. Now this happened again (3 weeks since the first time) and I'm gonna have to call them up again. My question is, should I buy a cheap android phone (I've been looking at the Moto E15) and lug it around just for banking and occasionally for the microsoft authenticator for work? Is this a common thing that people with a similar issue do? Should I just wait for the web app (problem with that is that all internet purchases have to be confirmed via the stupid app and idk how that will be handled when the web app rolls out)? Sorry if this is the wrong place to ask this and thanks in advance to those who take the time to reply! 🙏😅

Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company’s capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media’s review of the material. The leak follows others obtained and verified by 404 Media over the last 18 months. Those leaks impacted both Cellebrite and its competitor Grayshift, now owned by Magnet Forensics. Both companies constantly hunt for techniques to unlock phones law enforcement have physical access to. “You can Teams meeting with them. They tell everything. Still cannot extract esim on Pixel. Ask anything,” a user called rogueFed wrote on the GrapheneOS forum on Wednesday, speaking about what they learned about Cellebrite capabilities. GrapheneOS is a security- and privacy-focused Android-based operating system. rogueFed then posted two screenshots of the Microsoft Teams call. The first was a Cellebrite Support Matrix, which lays out whether the company’s tech can, or can’t, unlock certain phones and under what conditions. The second screenshot was of a Cellebrite employee. 💡 Do you know anything else about phone unlocking technology? I would love to hear from you. Using a non-work device, you can message me securely on Signal at joseph.404 or send me an email at joseph@404media.co. According to another of rogueFed’s posts, the meeting took place in October. The meeting appears to have been a sales call. The employee is a “pre sales expert,” according to a profile available online. The Support Matrix is focused on modern Google Pixel devices, including the Pixel 9 series. The screenshot does not include details on the Pixel 10, which is Google’s latest device. It discusses Cellebrite’s capabilities regarding ‘before first unlock’, or BFU, when a piece of phone unlocking tech tries to open a device before someone has typed in the phone’s passcode for the first time since being turned on. It also shows Cellebrite’s capabilities against after first unlock, or AFU, devices. Screenshot via GrapheneOS forum. The Support Matrix also shows Cellebrite’s capabilities against Pixel devices running GrapheneOS, with some differences between phones running that operating system and stock Android. Cellebrite does support, for example, Pixel 9 devices BFU. Meanwhile the screenshot indicates Cellebrite cannot unlock Pixel 9 devices running GrapheneOS BFU. In a statement, Victor Cooper, senior director of corporate communications and content strategy at Cellebrite, told 404 Media “We do not disclose or publicize the specific capabilities of our technology. This practice is central to our security strategy, as revealing such details could provide potential criminals or malicious actors with an unintended advantage.” Google did not immediately respond to a request for comment. GrapheneOS is a long running project which makes sizable security changes to an Android device. “GrapheneOS is focused on substance rather than branding and marketing. It doesn't take the typical approach of piling on a bunch of insecure features depending on the adversaries not knowing about them and regressing actual privacy/security. It's a very technical project building privacy and security into the OS rather than including assorted unhelpful frills or bundling subjective third party apps choices,” the project’s website reads. As well as being used by the privacy and security conscious, criminals also turn to GrapheneOS. After the FBI secretly ran its own backdoored encrypted phone company for criminals, some drug traffickers and the people who sell technology to the underworld shifted to using GrapheneOS devices with Signal installed, according to interviews with phone sellers. In their forum post, rogueFed wrote that the “meeting focused specific on GrapheneOS bypass capability.” They added “very fresh info more coming.”

A very, very helpful article to help get people we fight with to understand why this is important for anyone and everyone. Send this to friends and family.

This idiots going to get it banned

And no i do not have the privilege of running a local model. I have heard of a AI called Maple and tried it out, it was pretty limited to the point that it was a deal breaker (25 messages per week cap). I would like to know more services

Hey, folks! Please, tell me what you think about Tornet + VPN combination. To be exact in-browser VPN extention. If you connect to TOR proxy first and then connect to VPN you don't expose your real IP to a VPN-provider and conceal the fact you're using TOR (to prevent captchas on sites etc ). This way you could use any VPN (even free tear propriety) Am i right?

I am on GrapheneOS, but this concerns Android as a whole. From the options of **Fdroid** and **GitHub (Obtainium)** which is the safest way to install an app? From the GrapheneOS forums, I see many people recommending GitHub over Fdroid as it is straight from the source. I know its true, but if a developer adds a 'not-so-safe' piece of code or introduces tracking, Obtainium would automatically update my app without letting me know about the changes. But from what I have seen from Fdroid they usually pause or cancel the update or app if these changes were to take place (Example, Simple Gallery or Mull for Android). So I am confused. Whom should I trust more, **Fdroid with their own app builds or the Developers on GitHub**? Also I have seen that Obtainium when used with a VPN to fetch app updates, will get rate limited by GitHub. Also I don't really like GitHub as a code repository, with their tracking and rate limiting. I don't know if Fdroid tracks user.

Many people argue you have to trade convenience in order to get privacy when it comes to cell phones in the technological world. But can we take a moment to appreciate just how much convenience you can obtain with a privacy-focused ROM I mean think about it, what makes a smartphone? The ability to make phone calls the ability to text message somehow, some way, as well as the ability to access the internet and properly GPS If your phone can do those things, it is absolutely a smart phone by all conceivable metrics. Many people can play that a completely de-googled phone is simply too frustrating to work with. It's still a far cry away from digital minimalism or monasticism.

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