A place to discuss privacy and freedom in the digital world.
Privacy has become a very important issue in modern society, with companies and governments constantly abusing their power, more and more people are waking up to the importance of digital privacy.
In this community everyone is welcome to post links and discuss topics related to privacy.
Some Rules
- Posting a link to a website containing tracking isn’t great, if contents of the website are behind a paywall maybe copy them into the post
- Don’t promote proprietary software
- Try to keep things on topic
- If you have a question, please try searching for previous discussions, maybe it has already been answered
- Reposts are fine, but should have at least a couple of weeks in between so that the post can reach a new audience
- Be nice :)
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Depending on your threat model, not very important. What are the chances that 1) someone will have hacked Mullvad’s server and installed a compromised version of the browser, and 2) you happen to download the compromised version before the hack is discovered and mitigated?
Also, the signature and the package appear to be on the same server, so what’s necessarily going to stop the hacker from updating the signature to match their hacked package?[Edit: It’s a GPG signature, not a simple hash signature, so I guess that’s so not trivial after all.]Right. The risk is low, but nonzero.
You’ll want to make sure that the key you’re validating is provided through another trusted channel, so that an attacker can’t provide a bad download and have you check it against their bad key too.
That’s kind of what I figured, although after following Mullvad Browser’s instructions for verification, I did get two different RSA keys, if that means anything . . .