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Joined 17d ago
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Cake day: Mar 19, 2025

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Right?! This is why I love the Fediverse and FOSS.

Have a good night/day

Hope you find new fun ideas as well!


I think that’s by design and the nature of the setup. Anyone with the URL can communicate.

If your other comms method is compromised this doesn’t have much use. Which is a different problem all together. I think this would work great as something like a deadrop so two completely faceless people can communicate. I like it a lot.


I don’t know yet. It’s more a thought experiment than anything else.

https://github.com/muke1908/chat-e2ee

Looks like the URL is part of the seed and salt which is cool.

Proving who you are is done in another stream. Like MFA.

You do a one time pad, generate the URL with that. Communicate what’s needed, then the URL dies.

I’m still noodling with it.


https://medium.com/sessionstack-blog/how-javascript-works-cryptography-how-to-deal-with-man-in-the-middle-mitm-attacks-bf8fc6be546c

I still don’t see how

swap to a modified JS that exfiltrates the e2ee key

or

add additional keys

Wouldn’t significantly change the recieved hash and break the stream thus ending comms. Also unless you’re hosting and building it yourself you have to trust the recipient and the cloud host.

I agree if an attacker owns the server comms can be compromised. I thought that was the benefit of the ephemeral nature. It’s for quick relay of information. Best practices would probably include another cypher within the messages themselves like a one time pad or some such.

https://www.itstactical.com/intellicom/tradecraft/uncrackable-diy-pencil-and-paper-encryption/

https://github.com/muke1908/chat-e2ee


It has. Strangely enough they posted a code of conduct after that feedback and started weilding the ban hammer. However I cannot speak to outside forums like XDA or Reddit or even comms here. I tend to stick to their forums or github

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/t/general

https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues


Fragility is by design as it’s ephemeral comms. Swapping the js decryption doesn’t make sense as wouldn’t the client just fail or refuse the message stream as the decrypt/encrypt changed? It’s an interesting problem. Thanks for giving me something to noodle on.


Can you expand more on the key management? I thought https://chat-e2ee-2.azurewebsites.net/ passes a PSK Through the header and sets that as a cookie in the browser to sign further comms. I could be mistaken of course.