he/him/his, cis, gay, husband, Beagle chew-toy, JavaScript jockey, Rustacean

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  • 10 Comments
Joined 4Y ago
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Cake day: Apr 06, 2021

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For disappearing messages to work, your conversation partner has to promise they won’t take photos of their screen, and they have to promise to use an app that actually implements the feature instead of just pretending to, and the app developers have to promise to have implemented the code to delete a message when the service says it should

Is there actually a cryptographically-sound and physically-complete method for ensuring that a message is only legible for a temporary duration once it leaves your own device and is delivered to someone elses?


Hmmm, is CloudFlare known for being a bad actor in terms of privacy?

Setting that aside, no matter what you pick, you’ll be exposing your IP address, from which your ISP and/or general location may be derived

If you don’t trust CloudFlare with that information then you basically cannot trust anyone else, so maybe you’d need to run your own service and ping that instead now that you’re in a situation where you can only trust yourself 🤷

The other issue that comes to mind is that you’re only testing reachability to one address, which means you could get a false negative where that address stops working but the rest of the internet is actually fine


Proton emails are stored in an encrypted form that goes beyond the simple authentication that is part of the POP/IMAP specifications

Proton does have open-source bridges/proxies, so they aren’t hiding these details from us

Perhaps Thunderbird could be enhanced to support the Proton features directly?


EFF still recommend Signal (and others) for people fitting various risk profiles: https://ssd.eff.org/



Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol
> We believe that the key encapsulation mechanism we have selected, CRYSTALS-Kyber, is built on solid foundations, but to be safe we do not want to simply replace our existing elliptic curve cryptography foundations with a post-quantum public key cryptosystem. Instead, we are augmenting our existing cryptosystems such that an attacker must break both systems in order to compute the keys protecting people’s communications. > > ... > > Our new protocol is already supported in the latest versions of Signal’s client applications and is in use for chats initiated after both sides of the chat are using the latest Signal software. In the coming months (after sufficient time has passed for everyone using Signal to update), we will disable X3DH for new chats and require PQXDH for all new chats. In parallel, we will roll out software updates to upgrade existing chats to this new protocol.
fedilink

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/1073275 > Great explainer / FAQ > > I'll probably still use my Precursor and Yubikeys for the most part, but I'll definitely enable Passkeys wherever they are an option
fedilink

While it ended up shutting down, the fact that Google Stadia was also a Linux-based gaming platform might also have factored into the ecosystem improvements and interest, maybe just a little bit


It’s possible that SteamOS and the SteamDeck are part of the incentive that finally made nVidia get to work on open-source GPU drivers and Wayland-compatibility


> Today’s release of Total Cookie Protection is the result of experimentation and feature testing, first in ETP Strict Mode and Private Browsing windows, then in Firefox Focus earlier this year. We’re now making it a default feature for all Firefox desktop users worldwide.
fedilink

Okay, you got me stumped here

Either I added my 3x Yubikey security keys prior to that feature being taken away, or there’s a bug, or there’s some condition that has to be met before you can add security keys to your account: are you using a compatible web browser (e.g. recent Firefox), and have you downloaded/viewed/printed your recovery codes?

Mobile phones are the least secure device that you are likely to own

Un-nuanced absolutist statements like this grind my gears a little, haha

SMS is plain-text, and codes from the authenticator apps (and possibly also the GitHub Mobile app) can be phished, so in this regard I agree that the security key option offers the strongest safety/privacy, but those other phone options are still better than nothing for the majority of users

As far as devices I own, the only TV I could buy here was one running Android 10 without any software updates in the last 2 years, I feel I can confidently state that the TV is less secure than the phone I bought this year with an OS patch from this month


Please stop sharing inaccurate information

There are many 2FA options, and you never need to add a phone number to your account if you don’t want to


There are a range of two-factor authentication mechanisms that can be added to your GitHub account, so this does not require sharing your cell phone number with them at all if you don’t want to

I’m not sure why people are complaining about this change, this seems like a reasonable security uplift that will hopefully be adopted across more services