There seem to be two main arguments put forth here:
To which I respond:
If you have average security needs, you probably don’t need to worry about this. If you have reason to believe someone well-resourced and dangerous wants to compromise your phone, you should probably be extremely selective about what apps you install and where you get them.
It is increasingly unrealistic to entirely prevent children from having unsupervised access to internet-connected devices from a young age, but attempts to make it impossible for anyone under 18 to access porn are equally unrealistic, and often far worse than the problem they purport to solve.
With good parenting, the possibility of accessing porn won’t harm most kids. It’s not just about keeping them away from it, but about teaching healthy and realistic attitudes toward sex.
Kids can’t use computers, and that’s not good for the world. If teenagers figure out enough about how the computer works to get around the parental controls and watch porn, I consider that a net win.
I don’t actually care if teenagers sophisticated enough to do that see porn.
In a January blog post, it said age verification should take place on users’ devices, such as through their operating system, rather than on individual, age-restricted sites.
The details of this are potentially problematic, as they could preclude the use of open source browsers and operating systems.
It would be great to standardize an HTTP header that says the user is underage, which could be sent by any OS/browser combination that has suitable parental controls.
Terms like “safe” and “private” are not binary.
Are the contents of your Signal conversations on an iPhone private with regard to mass surveillance conducted by governments and ISPs? Probably. Apple uses security and privacy as marketing points, and there are a whole lot of people looking for vulnerabilities in its products who are incentivized to disclose them (possibly with a delay for patches). Signal itself takes steps to prevent data leaks to less secure parts of the OS and other apps.
Would your conversations remain private in the face of a targeted attack against your device by a nation state willing to spend a significant amount of time and money when you’re using Signal on an iPhone that’s presumably used for purposes other than secure conversations with a small set of people you know? Almost certainly not.
I use Matrix, and I’ve moved some conversations with people I met in public rooms there to Signal because it kept failing to transfer keys rendering it unable to decrypt messages. I haven’t seen that in a while so maybe it’s fixed, but I haven’t been using it for one-to-one conversations lately.
Unfortunately, I’ve found most people have a lot of resistance to adding another messaging app. I don’t really understand why that is, but it’s true. Asking someone to install a messaging app when I’m their only contact who uses it and they have another way to contact me has a success rate near zero.
What is this? A Twitter post?
Just about. JWZ is known for his cynical hot takes on tech in general.
I don’t think any of his complaints are invalid, though his conclusions are uncharitable at best. Making a communication tool that’s both reasonably secure and sufficiently palatable to people who don’t know how to use computers to achieve broad adoption is a hard problem with no perfect solutions. If he has a better idea, well… he’s a skilled and somewhat famous programmer; he’s better equipped than most to implement it.
It looks like it offers:
It is possible this would involve keeping a log of your browsing activity. Most of it doesn’t sound especially useful, especially in the likely-crappy form an ISP is going to provide.
prevent screenshots or copying from an encrypted chat
Aside from the obvious analog hole, that’s only possible if the user’s device cooperates, which is never guaranteed.
There is no way to send messages to someone’s device and guarantee they won’t provide them to a third party. Technology can’t force an untrustworthy person to keep your secrets.
Signal does not attempt to stop me from taking screenshots, and all chats on Signal are encrypted.
Basically, anyone who can read your home directory could decrypt your Signal database. That’s about typical of traditional desktop applications, but questionable for security-oriented software. Mac OS and (sometimes) Linux have more robust credential management options, and Signal signaled (yes, pun intended) its intent to adopt them.
If you want actual help with these issues, try the GrapheneOS forum.
I’ve found gos extremely frustrating
Some parts of this are probably unavoidable. High-security systems tend to be inconvenient, and using a non-mainstream operating system often means limited third-party support.
I’m facing the nearly insurmountable task of convincing my friends, family, and colleagues to download and use signal when they are all using encrypted iMessage.
For reasons I can’t figure out, it seems Americans hate the idea of installing any third-party messaging apps. Most Europeans I know have at least two.
Most of my banking apps just simply do not work.
There’s some information on the GrahpeneOS forum, but if the bank insists on using Google’s device attestation, you may not be able to do much other than raise hell with customer service (please do this).
This is one of the reasons I run LineageOS rooted with Magisk; there’s a bypass for Google attestation. That, of course does not have the same security-first goals as GrapheneOS.
Holding down on the space bar to move the text cursor between characters.
This feature exists on some Android keyboards including AOSP keyboard and Heliboard, which are open source.
Phones also have web browsers, and Instagram is usable that way (several years ago, it was not). It is possible that privacy protections will look like automated behaviors to their systems.
Using an app on a device that’s used for little else and has minimal data stored and apps installed on it also limits the potential for data leaks, though probably not as effectively as the browser, particularly when your browser is Mull.
I don’t think Instagram can read your Matrix conversations, but may be able to predict your interests with fancy algorithms or buying information from data brokers, even if it’s related to things you did on another device.
If you want to be more sure it’s not spying on your phone, uninstall the app and use it through your web browser.
The alternative is safeStorage, which uses the operating system’s credential management facility if available. On Mac OS and sometimes Linux, this means another process running in the user’s account is prevented from accessing it. Windows doesn’t have a protection against that, but all three systems do protect the credentials if someone copies data offline.
Signal should change this, but it isn’t a major security flaw. If an attacker can copy your home directory or run arbitrary code on your device, you’re already in big trouble.
I never said anything to that effect. The ancestor comment discussed running Signal for Android inside an Android emulator for account creation, after which it could be linked to Signal desktop.
Someone could presumably fork Signal desktop to allow the scenario you’re describing, but I’m not aware of any such efforts.